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MAKING AN OFFER THEY CAN’T REFUSE: 
CORPORATE INVESTMENT IN AFRICA 
AND THE DIVESTMENT OF INDIGENOUS  
LAND RIGHTS 
NICHOLAS DORF* 
Abstract: International investment in African land is booming. In many circum-
stances, investors target land occupied by indigenous populations without official 
title. National laws providing protection for the land rights of these indigenous 
populations have proved rare and ineffective due to the driving need for invest-
ment and the perceived impediment to investment such laws create. The interna-
tional humanitarian legal regime likewise provides an insufficient forum for ef-
fective protection. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) should instead be modified 
to impose affirmative humanitarian obligations on investing corporations to en-
sure the preservation of indigenous land rights. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1884, the counts, barons, colonels, and kings of thirteen European na-
tions sat down in front of a large map of Africa in Chancellor Bismarck’s Ber-
lin residence.1 By February 1885, they had partitioned the map of the African 
continent piecemeal into colonies over which they would claim ownership.2 
They based these claims on the fiction that Africa was terra nullius and thus 
open for conquest.3 The following half-century saw a concerted effort to plant 
the flags of Europe in African soil.4 Through decolonization in the second half 
of the twentieth century, however, those states gradually emerged as independ-
ent.5 
While the traditional foreign claims to Africa on the political stage have 
ended, corporations have nonetheless continued annexing African land into the 
                                                                                                                           
 * Nicholas Dorf is an Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
 1 See ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR AND HERO-
ISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 84 (1998). 
 2 See id.; DAVID BIRMINGHAM, DECOLONIZATION OF AFRICA 1 (1995). 
 3 See JÉRÉMIE GILBERT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
FROM VICTIMS TO ACTORS 27 (2006). See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1701 (10th ed. 
2014) (defining terra nullius as the term for territory not belonging to any particular country). 
 4 See BIRMINGHAM, supra note 2, at 1. 
 5 See id.  
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modern era through economic investment.6 With indigenous, informal forms of 
property ownership vulnerable to exploitation, foreign developers and inves-
tors have engaged in an international “land grab” of vast tracts of African 
land.7 Corporations are often able to collude with the government to acquire 
the formal rights to such occupied land, and the incentive to do so is consider-
able: the estimated value of such land in the developing world that is held and 
occupied, but not legally owned, weighs in at $9.3 trillion.8 
While the threat of foreign corporations to the property rights of indige-
nous peoples has recently gained recognition as a growing issue, there has 
been little effective national legislation or protection implemented within Afri-
can states to address it.9 In addition, there has been no international regional 
instrument for Africa governing the rights of indigenous peoples.10 Further-
more, the international instruments at a universal level are less integrated into 
the African human rights system than that of other regions.11 
Part I of this Note explores the nature and scale of the indigenous agrarian 
communities in several African states, as well as the state of foreign invest-
ment in these areas and its impact on indigenous communities. Part II analyzes 
the current body of international law on the property rights of indigenous peo-
ples, as well as the development of national laws in Africa. Part III first 
demonstrates that the current national legislation and international treaties are 
unlikely to protect the land rights of indigenous peoples effectively due to a 
lack of national incentive and the insufficiency of the international framework. 
Part III further argues that instead, an effective solution should come from the 
home states of corporate actors, in the form of modifications to the bilateral 
investment treaties to impose affirmative human rights obligations on corpora-
tions. 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See Claire Provost, New International Land Deals Database Reveals Rush to Buy Up Africa, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/apr/27/international-
land-deals-database-africa, archived at http://perma.cc/QA49-VMWK. 
 7 See id.; Stefaan Smis, Dorothée Cambou & Genny Ngende, The Question of Land Grab in Afri-
ca and the Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Traditional Lands, Territories and Resources, 35 LOY. L.A. 
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 8 See Milt Reimers, Stuck in “No Man’s Land”: How Developing Countries Can Allocate Prop-
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PUB. INT. L. 1, 2 (2009); Korir Sing’ Oei A. & Jared Shepherd, ‘In Land We Trust’: The Endorois’ 
Communication and the Quest for Indigenous People’s Right for Africa, 16 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
57, 62 (2010); Smis et al., supra note 7, at 497; see also Saturnino Borras Jr. & Jennifer Franco, From 
Threat to Opportunity? Problems with a “Code of Conduct” for Land Grabbing, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. 
& DEV. L.J. 507, 509 (2010). 
 9 See Smis et al., supra note 7, at 531. 
 10 See id. at 493. 
 11 See id. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Nature of African Communal Property into the Modern Era 
To understand fully the extent and impact of foreign purchases of land in 
African nations on indigenous communities, it is helpful to examine the tradi-
tional nature of property rights in rural African communities as compared to 
the formal institutions of titling and ownership associated with modern corpo-
rate transactions.12 
At the end of the 19th century, before the encroachment of European po-
litical powers, most land resources in Africa were used primarily as com-
mons.13 The characteristics of the commons defy Western ideas of private 
property owned by individuals: it is held as a trans-generational asset, man-
aged by the community at different levels of social organization, and used in 
function-specific ways such as grazing, recreation, cultivation, and transit.14 
The commons area formed private property owned by the group, but it defied 
the traditional requirement of title granted from a national authority.15 
The lack of formal ownership of land permeated pre-colonial society 
across the continent.16 In South Africa, for example, the concept of individual 
ownership of land was quite limited.17 The system operated according to status 
relationships between individuals and their obligations to one another with re-
gard to communal property, rather than by an individual’s ability to assert 
property claims against others.18 In Kenya, the Endorois people maintained a 
semi-nomadic pastoral community under this customary system of tenure into 
the modern, post-independence era.19 Similarly, the Himba people maintained 
a general communal system of grazing throughout Namibia.20 In these com-
munities, each family owns the land around its immediate household, with land 
rights stretching back in time and respected by all.21 Although the members 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 13–52. 
 13 See Okoth Ogendo, The Tragic African Commons: A Century of Expropriation, Suppression 
and Subversion, in LAND REFORM AND AGRARIAN CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 2002, at 3 (Pro-
gramme for Land and Agrarian Studies, School of Government, University of the Western Cape, Pa-
per No. 24, 2002). 
 14 See id. 
 15 See id. at 4. 
 16 See id. at 3–5. 
 17 See WJ du Plessis, African Indigenous Land Rights in a Private Ownership Paradigm, 14 
POTSCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L. J. 45, 49 (2011). 
 18 See id. 
 19 See Sing’ Oei A. & Shepherd, supra note 8, at 60. 
 20 Sidney L. Harring, “God Gave Us This Land”: The OvaHimba, the Proposed Epupa Dam, the 
Independent Namibian State, and Law and Development in Africa, 14 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 35, 
42 (2001). 
 21 See id. 
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often do not hold official title, the community respects local customary law, 
which establishes individual rights to land.22 
Pastoral systems like these remain very common in south and central Af-
rica today.23 Widespread attempts to modernize state practice in the past half-
century, however, have led to the implementation of European systems of for-
mal titling within the legislature of many nations, although with mixed suc-
cess.24 These programs of formalization have proceeded partially on the theory 
that such titling will spur economic growth by allowing the creation of a land 
market and thus, incentivize owners to invest in their land given the added pro-
tection of a formal title.25 Inherent conflicts have arisen in the clash between 
traditional, community-established rights to property and these attempts to es-
tablish formalized systems, even to the point of not accepting the state-
imposed system.26 The Maasai tribes present an example of this systemic con-
flict: the Kenyan government established formal group ranches with formal 
borders; however, because those borders conflicted inherently with the tradi-
tional migratory patterns, the tribes have disregarded the property boundaries 
and maintained their previous semi-nomadic patterns.27 
While there may be unavoidable problems in the reconciliation of these 
two systems, a formal system of modern property laws is not inherently inimi-
cal to the nature of the customary land rights of indigenous communities: a 
number of states have indeed incorporated recognition of communal and cus-
tomary land rights into their formal systems.28 Instead, the real threat to these 
land rights stems from the ease with which joint corporate and government 
actors can exploit these modern legal procedures when the system does not 
provide adequate oversight and protection.29 
B. The Extent of Corporate Investment in African Land 
In what has been termed a second “scramble for Africa,” corporations 
over the past decade and a half have been contracting with African states to 
invest in large swaths of untitled land for the purpose of developing natural 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See id. at 78. 
 23 See id. at 42. 
 24 See Lorenzo Cotula, Camilla Toulmin & Ced Hesse, Land Tenure and Administration in Afri-
ca: Lessons of Experience and Emerging Issues, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV. 1, 3 (2004), available 
at http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/9305IIED.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7MBF-GNLA. 
 25 See id. 
 26 See Lindsey L. Wiersma, Indigenous Lands as Cultural Property: A New Approach to Indige-
nous Land Claims, 54 DUKE L.J. 1061, 1068 n.40 (2005). 
 27 See id. 
 28 See Cotula et al., supra note 24, at 5. 
 29 See infra notes 47–52. 
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resources, farming, and other economic purposes.30 These tracts, however, are 
often occupied by indigenous populations.31 While this phenomenon has been 
occurring in developing nations with indigenous populations worldwide, the 
effect has been particularly pronounced in Africa, where the majority of such 
land deals take place.32 
Since 2000, investors have bought or leased almost 5 percent of Africa’s ar-
able land.33 In 2010 alone, between 51 and 63 million hectares of land became 
part of land deals, whether finalized or in negotiation, in twenty-seven African 
states.34 Some of the deals are staggeringly large and have appeared numerously 
across some of Africa’s poorest states.35 In Madagascar, a South Korean compa-
ny entered into a contract which would have given the government $6 billion in 
exchange for a 99-year lease on half of the nation’s arable land to grow corn and 
palm oil.36 In South Sudan, the government granted a Norwegian company a 
similar 99-year lease on 179,000 hectares of land at a cost of just $0.07 a hec-
tare.37 In Guinea, an American company acquired 100,000 hectares of land;38and 
in Gabon, a Belgian company purchased 300,000 hectares.39 
The relatively recent appearance of such acquisitions in Africa on such an 
unprecedented scale is a result of a confluence of factors unique to the conti-
nent revolving around the production of food and farmable resources.40 Be-
tween 2007 and 2008, Africa witnessed a global food crisis resulting in wide-
spread social unrest in many developing countries.41 As a result, the World 
Bank Group has been providing incentives to invest in agribusiness such as 
direct financing, advisory services, and aid in legislative and policy reform to 
remove barriers to foreign direct investment.42 Given these incentives and the 
rising demand for food in the wake of the food crisis, Western investors have 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Jeremie Gilbert & David Keane, The New Scramble for Africa: Towards a Human-Rights 
Based Approach to Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in the Southern Africa Development Community 
Region, in SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY LAND ISSUES 143, 145 (Ben Chigara 
ed., 2012); Smis et al., supra note 7, at 497. 
 31 See Gilbert & Keane, supra note 30, at 145; Smis et al., supra note 7, at 497. 
 32 See Provost, supra note 6.  
 33 See id. 
 34 See Cecilie Friis & Anette Reenberg, Land Grab in Africa: Emerging Land System Drivers in a 
Teleconnected World, GLOBAL LAND PROJECT INT’L PROJECT OFFICE 1, 11 (2010). 
 35 See infra notes 36–38. 
 36 See Scott Baldouf, Hunger and Food Security: Is Africa Selling the Farm?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-Issues/2011/0206/Hunger-and-
food-security-Is-Africa-selling-the-farm, archived at http://perma.cc/GB8H-DC65. 
 37 See Provost, supra note 6. 
 38 See Smis et al., supra note 7, at 497. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See infra notes 42–45. 
 41 See infra notes 42–45. 
 42 See Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics of Food, 49 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 101, 110 (2013). 
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begun to see agricultural investment as relatively safe while other traditional 
fields of investment have declined in security after the financial crisis.43 Addi-
tionally, states with quickly growing populations such as China and South Ko-
rea have begun to use foreign investment in agriculture as a means to secure 
their own food supply.44 While the demand for food products drives invest-
ment from South Asia and the Middle East, states in Europe and North Ameri-
ca without such food scarcity are similarly investing due to the perception that 
there will be a long-term demand for biofuels in industrialized countries.45 
These global trends in agricultural investment have resulted in the gravita-
tion of investors towards Africa as a particularly irresistible market for develop-
ment.46 The soil on the arable land in many African states is particularly rich and 
fertile, ensuring the success and growth of agricultural development.47 Not only 
is the farmland itself of good quality, it is quite abundant, with states such as 
Madagascar and Mozambique potentially possessing over 16 million hectares of 
land suitable for cultivation.48 The proximity of these large swaths of available 
land to Europe is particularly attractive to northern investors, while the ability of 
the farmland to produce palm oil is attractive to those from the east due to the 
growing scarcity of land in Malaysia and Indonesia, the largest palm oil growing 
countries.49 While these factors alone would make these untitled farmlands suf-
ficiently attractive to foreign investment, the governments of many African 
states are going to great lengths to make this land even more lucrative for inves-
tors, such as offering state-acquired land at very cheap prices or allowing 100 
percent of produce to be exported.50 To further encourage investment, many Af-
rican nations, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, have entered into bilateral in-
vestment treaties (BITs) with capital exporting states to further encourage in-
vestment.51 These treaties are designed to promote foreign direct investment in 
the African state by offering two attractions to foreign investors: substantive 
rights and protections, and dispute settlement procedures.52 The host state prom-
                                                                                                                           
 43 See id. 
 44 See id. at 112. 
 45 George Schoneveld, The Anatomy of Large-Scale Farmland Acquisitions in Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca 8 (Ctr. for Int’l Forestry Research, Working Paper No. 85, 2011), available at http://www.cifor.
org/publications/pdf_files/WPapers/WP85Schoneveld.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SAN5-ME2F. 
 46 See supra notes 42–45; infra notes 47–52. 
 47 See Smis et al., supra note 7, at 495. 
 48 See Schoneveld, supra note 45, at 13. 
 49 See id. at 9. 
 50 See ‘Land Grab’—Boon or Curse? Several Foreign Countries Have Long-Term Leases on 
Vast Swatches of Land in Africa to Grow Crops for Their Own Consumption or for Biofuels. What 
Implication Does This Have on the Continent’s Development Strategy?, AFRICAN BUSINESS, Aug./
Sept. 2010, at 32, 32. 
 51 See Alec R. Johnson, Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties in Sub-Saharan Africa, 59 
EMORY L.J. 919, 919 (2010). 
 52 Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights, in INEF Research Paper 
Series on Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility and Sustainable Development 2010, at 8 (Inst. for 
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ises to provide protection against certain conduct, such as expropriation and dis-
criminatory treatment; investors are given confidence in these protections 
through the ability to access international arbitration to settle investment dis-
putes.53 This provides a stable environment for foreign direct investment, and 
likewise signals to investors that the host state has a credible commitment to pro-
tecting foreign direct investment.54 BITs have become “the primary legal mech-
anism governing [foreign direct investment].”55 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. National Legislation Protecting Indigenous Rights 
The issue of corporate acquisition of untitled indigenous lands has not 
been ignored within the legal frameworks of affected African nations, both at 
the constitutional and legislative level.56 The constitutional frameworks of sev-
eral African states contain provisions that address indirectly the rights of these 
indigenous people by protecting the communal property they often occupy.57 
The Rwandan constitution contains a provision that renders the right to private 
property inviolable, even if the land is owned collectively rather than individu-
ally.58 Such a provision protecting collective property is found in the laws of a 
number of nations, including Chad, Egypt, South Africa, and Uganda.59 While 
not specifically offering a normative basis for the rights of indigenous popula-
tions, this type of provision nonetheless indirectly offers protection to such 
communities, as the communal property protected is likewise often untitled.60 
While these states have taken the path of indirectly protecting indigenous 
populations by promoting the related field of communal land rights, some have 
taken the opposite route of indirectly protecting land rights through the recog-
nition and promotion of indigenous rights.61 One method taken to achieve this 
has been to ensure indigenous representation within the government.62 Kenya, 
for example, since 2010 has reserved seats in the national assembly for repre-
sentatives from vulnerable groups, and Burundi expressly requires that three 
                                                                                                                           
Dev. & Peace 03/2010), available at http://www.humanrights-business.org/files/international_invest
ment_agreements_and_human_rights.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N5KN-JXUF. 
 53 See id.  
 54 See Johnson, supra note 51, at 925. 
 55 See id. at 924. 
 56 See Jernej Letnar Cernic, State Obligations Concerning Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Their 
Ancestral Lands: Lex Imperfecta?, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1129, 1143 (2013). 
 57 See id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See id. 
 60 See id. 
 61 See id.; Smis et al., supra note 7, at 531. 
 62 See Smis et al., supra note 7, at 531. 
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members of the national assembly come from a particular indigenous popula-
tion.63 
Of the nations that have begun implementing such reforms, the Republic 
of the Congo has taken particularly advanced steps in implementing official 
protection of indigenous rights, specifically with regard to land and property.64 
In February of 2011, the “Law 5-2011 On the Promotion and Protection of the 
Indigenous Population” attempted to comprehensively address the rights of the 
indigenous pygmy population.65 The pygmy population of the Republic of the 
Congo has in the past been marginalized to an exceptional degree in terms of 
inclusion in the political process and the protection from basic human rights 
violations.66 This indigenous population is comprised of 300,000 individuals, 
or approximately 10 percent of the total population of the state; therefore, this 
legislation seems starkly necessary in light of the sheer size of the population 
involved.67 The law specifically provides the indigenous population with a 
comprehensive set of human rights, and a large portion is indeed dedicated to 
the right to property.68 First, the law grants indigenous communities the right 
to own, possess, access, and use the lands and natural resources they have tra-
ditionally used or occupied for their subsistence, pharmacopeia, and work.69 
Additionally, the state must legally recognize land rights based on customary 
ownership, even where indigenous peoples do not possess any kind of formal 
title.70 Furthermore, this law goes a step further than its counterparts by offi-
cially recognizing, to some extent at least, the potential issues that may arise 
from a lack of formal title for indigenous populations in particular.71 
More importantly, the law institutes requirements for the conditions under 
which indigenous land may be expropriated by the state to corporate actors.72 
Article 33 states that indigenous populations can only be displaced for the pub-
lic interest, and the following Article provides for the “benefits provided by 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See id. 
 64 See id. at 532. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See Congo: NGO Denounces Widespread Violation of Pygmy Rights, IRIN HUMANITARIAN 
NEWS & ANALYSIS (Feb. 16, 2004), http://www.irinnews.org/report/48596/congo-ngo-denounces-
widespread-violation-of-pygmy-rights, archived at http://perma.cc/59HD-QFHE. 
 67 See Indigenous Peoples in the Republic of Congo, INT’L WORK GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AF-
FAIRS, http://www.iwgia.org/regions/africa/republic-of-congo (last visited Oct. 29, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/WX2D-K5JD. 
 68 See Smis, et al., supra note 7, at 532. 
 69 See Act No. 5-2011 of Feb. 25, 2011, Portant Promotion et Protection des Droits des Popula-
tions Autochtones [On the Promotion and Protection of Indigenous Populations], art. 31 (Dem. Rep. 
Congo), available at http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_news_files/0368_Congolese_Legislation_on_
Indigenous_Peoples.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6XNV-N863 [hereinafter Act No. 5-2011]. 
 70 See id. art. 32. 
 71 See id.; Cernic, supra note 56, at 1143. 
 72 See Act No. 5-2011, supra note 69, arts. 33–38. 
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law” in the case of such an expropriation.73 In addition, the law provides sub-
stantial rights for the indigenous peoples throughout the process of any project, 
whether government or private, conducted on the land.74 Article 35 requires an 
impact assessment for any project on the lands occupied or utilized by the in-
digenous populations; Article 36 grants indigenous populations the “rights to 
define the priorities and strategies for development, utilization and control of 
their lands and other re-sources” in such a project; and Article 38 requires that 
“the indigenous populations are consulted before the formulation or establish-
ment of any project having effect on the lands and resources which they pos-
sess and use traditionally.”75 The Republic of the Congo was the first African 
country to pass such a law that includes these types of legal protections, 
through which both the legality of expropriation as well as treatment of indig-
enous rights during the subsequent projects are addressed.76 
The Congolese law represents the first advanced attempt at protection of 
land rights specifically tailored to indigenous peoples, and a number of other 
nations in the wake of the growing publicity surrounding indigenous rights 
have begun to implement similar comprehensive systems for protecting untit-
led lands.77 Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania all have progressive laws that 
require approval of land transfers by the communities or customary leaders 
residing on them, and have additional requirements for providing access rights 
and just compensation.78 The Mozambique Land Act requires that such ap-
proval and consent take place whether or not the land is officially titled to en-
sure that negotiation of benefit-sharing agreements occurs between the investor 
and the local groups.79 Other states, such as Madagascar and Ethiopia, have 
systems that require consultation before investment.80 These systems, in theo-
ry, should protect the interests of the indigenous populations in their own 
land.81 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Id. arts. 33–34. 
 74 See id. arts. 35–38. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See Congo: New Law to Protect Rights of Indigenous Peoples, IRIN HUMANITARIAN NEWS & 
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Consent, and Recompense in Large-Scale Land Deals for Biofuels Projects in Africa, 37 J. PEASANT 
STUD. 899, 907 (2010). 
 78 See Vermeulen & Cotula, supra note 77, at 907. 
 79 See id. at 908. 
 80 See Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics of Food, 49 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 101, 115 (2013). 
 81 See supra notes 77–80. 
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B. International Instruments Protecting Indigenous Rights 
The necessity for legal protection of the land rights of indigenous popula-
tions has gained recent recognition within the international legal framework as 
well, both at the regional and global level.82 Regionally, there has not been any 
international instrument that codifies the rights of indigenous populations in 
Africa.83 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, however, has 
nonetheless been extended into the role of monitoring the rights of indigenous 
peoples within the region.84 The Charter is a treaty that has been ratified by 
fifty-three African states, and every state in the African Union, barring the 
newly created South Sudan.85 Like other regional human rights instruments, 
the Charter establishes the basic human rights owed to every individual and 
imposes duties upon nations to uphold those rights.86 It is somewhat unique, 
however, in that it provides human rights for groups and peoples collectively in 
addition to the rights of individuals. 87 
Article 19 guarantees that distinct peoples have the right to equality, and 
Article 20 guarantees the right to self-determination for these peoples.88 These 
Articles generally establish the fundamental equal recognition needed for in-
digenous peoples to assert the rights granted by the subsequent Articles, which 
are more pertinent to the specific issue of land rights: Article 21 allows groups 
to freely dispose of their natural resources; Article 22 grants the right to eco-
nomic, social, and cultural development; Article 23 guarantees the right to 
peace and security; and Article 24 provides for a “general satisfactory envi-
ronment favorable to their development.”89 
The Charter established the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights as the investigative and enforcement mechanism connected to the rights 
and duties of the treaty, which was established “to promote human and peo-
ple’s rights and ensure their protection in Africa.”90 To assess and address the 
rights of indigenous populations in particular, the Commission established the 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See infra note 84; Smis et al., supra note 7, at 498. 
 83 See Smis et al., supra note 7, at 493. 
 84 Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa: About, AFRICAN COMM’N 
ON HUMAN & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/indigenous-
populations/about, archived at http://perma.cc/32ZQ-65JV [hereinafter Working Group: About]. 
 85 Ratification Table: African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFRICAN COMM’N ON 
HUMAN & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/S34F-HLAQ. 
 86 See generally African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), 
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter]. 
 87 See Roland Adjovi, Understanding the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, THINK 
AFRICA PRESS (Nov. 5, 2012), http://thinkafricapress.com/international-law-africa/african-charter-
human-peoples-rights, archived at http://perma.cc/YXL5-R3AG. 
 88 African Charter, supra note 86, arts. 19–20. 
 89 See id. arts. 21–24. 
 90 See id. art. 30. 
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Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities in 2000.91 The initial 
mandate of the Working Group was to release a report on the status of the 
rights of indigenous peoples on the continent, and the Group has since been 
permanently established with the tasks of gathering information pertaining to 
violations of indigenous people’s rights, providing recommendations and pro-
posals to prevent such violations, and cooperating with other international hu-
man rights mechanisms and organizations.92 
While the Working Group operates as an advisory body on the issue of 
indigenous rights, the African Charter does indeed provide for judicial en-
forcement mechanisms to prosecute violations of the duties and rights enumer-
ated in the Charter.93 A protocol to the Charter, which was adopted in 1998 and 
came into force in 2004, established the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights as a body tasked with rendering judgments on states’ compliance with 
the duties of the Charter.94 Although the court’s inaugural judgment was ren-
dered in 2009, its first judgment concerning the land rights of indigenous peo-
ples was not until March of 2013.95 The justices’ holding effectively banned 
land transactions in the Mau Forest Complex of Kenya, which is occupied by 
some 15,000 indigenous Ogiek families.96 The Kenyan government recently 
threatened the Ogiek with eviction under the pretense of environmental protec-
tion, and additionally lifted restrictions over land transactions in the forest in 
November of 2012, allowing those who had illegally gained title over occupied 
land to sell.97 
The Commission itself, as a quasi-judicial body, also has the ability to 
hear communications and render recommendations on the claims of indigenous 
groups that believe their rights under the charter have been violated.98 Articles 
56 through 59 allow communications to the Commission concerning an al-
leged violation of the Charter’s rights, and if the case meets the procedural 
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qualifications, the Commission will render a decision on the substance of the 
case.99 The case of the Endorois people of Kenya reached the merits with their 
communication of 2009, and the Commission issued a landmark decision con-
cerning the rights of indigenous peoples the following year.100 The Endorois 
people occupied land that was under the guardianship of the government based 
on the Native Land Trust Act, which left them vulnerable to local authorities 
colluding with the central government to abuse this relationship.101 In this par-
ticular communication, the Endorois claimed in the Kenyan national courts 
that they had been illegally evicted from and left out of the profit sharing struc-
ture of the national park on which they resided, but when this was denied, they 
then sought redress with the African Commission, claiming that the Kenyan 
state breached the African Charter by violating their right to property, culture, 
religion, and the development of natural resources.102 The Commission found 
that the Kenyan government had in fact violated Articles 8, 14, 17, 21, and 22 
of the Charter, and recommended restitution of the lands, recognition of their 
right to ownership, and compensation for harm.103 
The creation of international protections for indigenous peoples has oc-
curred not only within the region of Africa, but also globally among the na-
tions that make up the world’s most prevalent international institutions.104 The 
first global treaty to address the rights of indigenous peoples was the Interna-
tional Labor Organization’s Convention No. 107 Concerning the Protection 
and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in 
Independent Countries, ratified in 1957.105 Viewed as somewhat assimilationist 
and paternalistic, this was replaced by ILO Convention No. 167 in 1989, which 
contained improved procedural mechanisms for the protection of land rights.106 
Perhaps the most important international global instrument concerning the 
rights of indigenous peoples to date is, however, the United Nations Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).107 The UN Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations began working on the declaration in 1985, 
the first draft of which was presented to the Sub-Commission on the Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities eight years later in 1993.108 
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The Declaration in its final form was adopted fourteen years after that in 
2007.109 The United States, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia voted against 
the declaration and initially opposed its implementation, but by 2010 all had 
changed their position and announced their support.110 
The Declaration is especially important to the issue of land rights because 
of its focus and emphasis on the distinct relationship between indigenous peo-
ples and the land that they have traditionally used and possessed.111 Article 26 
specifically addresses the rights of indigenous peoples to land and resources, 
and in many ways appears similar to the previously described articles of the 
African Charter.112 The first subsection of this Article provides the general 
right of indigenous people “to lands, territories, and resources which they have 
traditionally owned, occupied, or otherwise used or acquired,” and the second 
subsection guarantees “the right to own, use, develop, and control the lands, 
territories and resources they possess by reason of traditional ownership or 
other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise 
acquired.”113 To facilitate retention of control over the process by which they 
exercise their right to land and resources, Article 32 guarantees the right of the 
indigenous peoples “to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the 
development or use of their lands or territories and other resources,” and re-
quires that states consult and cooperate with the indigenous population prior to 
the approval of any project.114 This instrument represents the current state of 
universally accepted international sentiment on the general rights of indige-
nous peoples.115 Unlike such explicitly humanitarian treaties, BITs have not 
functioned as a vehicle for the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, 
since they rarely (if ever) address humanitarian concerns, and instead focus on 
providing protections for foreign investors.116 
III. ANALYSIS 
While there may indeed be some form of legal protection in effect for in-
digenous populations at both the national and international levels, these protec-
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tions have thus far proved inadequate.117 National regulation is hampered by 
the lack of indigenous representation as well as the close connection between 
development needs and the goals of foreign investment.118 International in-
struments, on the other hand, have not been able to provide accessible and ef-
fective forums for enforcement.119 
A. The Present and Future Inadequacy of National Laws Protecting 
Indigenous Rights to Land 
Despite the relatively recent movement by a number of African nations to 
protect the rights of indigenous peoples, the current laws are inadequate in 
providing that protection and are unlikely to improve in practice due to nation-
al dependence on outside investment.120 
The inability of representative minority legislators to advocate loudly for 
the rights of minority indigenous groups is an apparent example of the inade-
quacies of these laws. As described above, there have been attempts by some 
nations, notably Kenya and Burundi, to implement requirements for minority 
representatives in the national assembly.121 The realities of elected politics, 
however, severely limit the ability of these legislators to effectuate change.122 
The inadequacy of these attempts to provide a voice for minority groups 
is particularly evident in Kenya.123 The dominance of political parties as gate-
keepers in the choosing of candidates has been the first major hurdle.124 While 
the 2010 constitution does have a new provision that allows independent can-
didates to run, the candidates that are party-sponsored among those that are 
competing for minority seats will likely remain dominant.125 Therefore, while 
indigenous representatives may be present within the political system, if party 
policy does not support indigenous interests, it may be difficult to effectively 
address those interests.126 
The costs of an electoral contest are a second major hurdle that influences 
the ability of both these parties and candidates to remain separate from the in-
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terests of international investors.127 In Kenya, many indigenous groups are se-
verely impoverished, and winning an election requires financial resources that 
are simply not available to them.128 Therefore, indigenous candidates must 
necessarily rely instead on funding from the economically dominant groups, 
and when elected, they are likely to serve the interests of those groups rather 
than the uninhibited interests of the indigenous communities.129 Kenya does 
indeed have a ban on direct donations to political parties from foreign interests, 
however, the dominant economic groups to which these candidates are behold-
en will almost invariably have ties to foreign investors.130 Additionally, more 
than 35 percent of African states including major investment centers like South 
Africa do not have any ban on such foreign contributions to political cam-
paigns.131 This increases the likelihood of foreign influence on the party policy 
because access to foreign funds may create a long-term reliance and dependen-
cy that restricts policy autonomy.132 
Finally, the ability of the indigenous representatives within the govern-
ment to pass effective protective legislation may be severely limited simply by 
their minority status on the legislature.133 While Kenya has been one of the 
most progressive states in implementing representation of politically bankrupt 
indigenous groups, the constitution guarantees only twelve seats out of 290 for 
candidates from “special interests.”134 Additionally, the process of selecting 
“special interest” candidates renders it possible that there will in fact be no 
seats guaranteed for indigenous minority representatives.135 While a holding of 
the Kenya High Court allows small, marginalized communities to be consid-
ered among these special interests, the method of selection makes no guaran-
tees for particular groups: each party submits a list of special interest candi-
dates from which a certain number will be selected depending on the party’s 
percentage of the vote, and the nature of what constitutes a special interest is 
entirely determined by the party.136 The fact that the party controls who sits in 
these special interest seats further ensures that the representatives toe the party 
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line in terms of policy.137 Outside of these guaranteed seats, an electoral sys-
tem can make it very difficult for indigenous populations to muster enough 
communal support to elect their candidate.138 Constituency boundaries are 
drawn with factors such as “community of interest, historical, economic, and 
cultural ties” only assuming secondary importance, while the size of the con-
stituency is the primary concern.139 
Despite the potential inability of representative legislators to effectively 
advocate the rights of indigenous groups, there has nonetheless been limited 
legislation passed in recent years precisely to protect the land rights of indige-
nous peoples.140 These laws, however, have for the most part failed to effec-
tively curb the deprivation of indigenous rights to land due to the collusion 
between the government and corporations.141 Since the fundamental cause of 
this failure is likely the continuing, insatiable need for foreign direct invest-
ment, it is unlikely that national laws will remedy this failure.142 
African states are going to great lengths to attract foreign investment, 
through both national regulations, like Morocco’s 100 percent export proposal, 
as well as international BITs.143 These efforts to attract investment stem not 
from a simple desire to integrate themselves into the global economic stage, 
but are rooted more deeply in a fundamental need for such investment to com-
bat the inherent problems of rapid development.144 The population of Africa is 
the fastest growing of any continent in the world, with estimates that the total 
population of the continent will double by 2036 and will reach two billion by 
2050.145 This population growth is causing great concern that there will be se-
rious negative economic consequences if it is not met with increased invest-
ment.146 In terms of energy needs alone, the European Union’s Special Repre-
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sentative to the African Union stated that the continent will require $40 billion 
annually to reach the energy sufficiency goal set for 2040.147 
The need for investment does not necessarily imply a need for the specific 
type of agricultural and land-purchase investment that is threatening indige-
nous populations.148 For example, there is need for investment in the areas of 
consumer demand and business financing, which would likely pose no threat 
to indigenous land rights.149 Some of the continent’s greatest needs, however, 
lie in infrastructure development and employment, which are indeed intimately 
tied to corporate land investment given the improvements promised by corpo-
rations.150 General urban infrastructure is fatally underfunded in terms of deal-
ing with growth and represents the continent’s largest hurdle to keeping pace 
with the population growth and urbanization.151 The World Bank estimates that 
sub-Saharan Africa has only been spending approximately $40 billion of the 
estimated $75 billion needed to develop and maintain adequate roads, transpor-
tation, electricity, water, and other vital infrastructure elements.152 Many Afri-
can nations also have a quickly growing middle class that can increase the de-
mand for basic infrastructural improvements; the growth of a middle class 
thereby compounds the demand for investment.153 Unemployment, particularly 
among the youth, is also a major problem for many African nations.154 South 
Africa, for example, saw unemployment rise to 25.2 percent in 2013, and 
youth unemployment in Africa is as high as 30 percent.155 
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This need for infrastructure development and employment opportunities 
closely mirrors the promised benefits of large corporate land transactions.156 In 
order to efficiently develop land, corporations often promise to create essential 
housing, roads, schools, and other improvements that will facilitate the crea-
tion of an economically viable project, although whether or not they follow 
through on these promises is far more varied.157 In addition, they almost invar-
iably promise the creation of much-needed rural employment for the local 
population.158 While the projects themselves will in fact bring capital to the 
state, African governments tend to evaluate projects on these broader economic 
benefits of employment generation and infrastructure development.159 
African states going forward have this driving need for capital and infra-
structural development that is satisfied by investment in land.160 Thus, the gov-
ernments of those states will likely avoid either enacting or enforcing national 
laws that make it difficult for such investment to occur—this may include laws 
that protect indigenous populations.161 With widespread investment across the 
continent there is a great likelihood of such a “race to the bottom,” where 
states will avoid creating real humanitarian protection in order to remain com-
petitive in attracting investment.162 
Whereas this is already evident in the glacial progress of African states to 
even enact laws, the avoidance of effective enforcement is likewise apparent in 
the states that have instituted such laws.163 One of the principle mechanisms 
for guaranteeing the rights of the indigenous populations is consultation with 
and approval of the local community.164 While this appears effective in theory, 
it is easily abused in practice to prevent any resistance to investment.165 Meet-
ings are often with community leaders or members of local government that 
have already had preliminary meetings with investors to promote investment, 
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and communities rarely have full access to information about a project.166 The 
requirements of the law for consultation and approval, even in progressive 
countries such as Mozambique, do not in practice include all affected individu-
als in the process; instead, too often they vest the power in local authorities to 
declare that satisfactory consultation occurred.167 Often the corporation is able 
to engage with a legally illiterate community directly, while local authorities 
act as middlemen who are not necessarily interested in providing protection.168 
Other legal frameworks, such as Kenya’s guardianship relationship, are open 
to abuse by the central government through collusion with the local authorities 
to privatize the land without regard to the needs of the local communities.169 
B. The Inadequacy of the Current International Framework in  
Protecting Indigenous Rights to Land 
Given the failure of national law to provide effective protections for the 
land rights of indigenous populations, the potential forum for protection may 
instead lie in the realm of international law.170 Despite its theoretical goal of 
protection, however, the current body of international law also fails in practice 
to effectively guarantee indigenous peoples’ rights to land.171 As with the im-
plementation of national law, international mechanisms provide an aspirational 
framework that does not reflect the realities on the ground.172 
The first major issue with the international legal framework within Africa 
is its lack of accessibility, particularly by indigenous groups.173 The African 
Commission on Peoples’ and Human Rights has only ever rendered a single 
decision in favor of an indigenous community as to the right of development, 
despite the recognition of such a right since the ratification of the African 
Charter.174 In fact, there have only been seven total decisions rendered by the 
Commission on the right of development, and only eight on the right to free 
disposal of natural resources.175 The procedural hurdles to having a communi-
cation heard are difficult to overcome, particularly due to the requirement that 
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national remedies be exhausted before bringing a claim before the Commis-
sion.176 Similarly, the African Court on Peoples’ and Human Rights has only 
rendered a single decision protecting the land rights of indigenous peoples.177 
Whatever the reason, when contrasted to the sheer number of massive land 
transactions in Africa over the past decade, the relative lack of representation 
of indigenous claims in the regional international system is indicative of a fail-
ure to provide an accessible forum.178 
Simply because there have not been many cases before the court as of to-
day does not necessarily mean that there will not be more in the future.179 Even 
if the court and the Commission manage to become a popular forum to cham-
pion the rights of indigenous peoples, however, the system will likely still be 
burdened by the classic failing of international adjudicatory bodies: the lack of 
an ability to enforce judgments against states effectively.180 This is not a prob-
lem unique to the enforcement of human rights in Africa: other international 
adjudicatory bodies, even those with almost universally ratified establishing 
treaties, have faced serious issues in effectively enforcing judgments.181 
Regional human rights courts in particular have had trouble convincing 
national courts to enforce their judgments.182 The Inter-American Court on 
Human Rights, for example, rendered a final decision on 105 cases as of 2008, 
and ninety-four of those were still under the court’s jurisdiction awaiting com-
pliance.183 The African Commission is likely to be plagued by a lack of effec-
tive enforcement of its decisions, particularly because of its own admission 
that its judgments are not binding.184 For example, with regard to its decision 
in the Endorois case, the Commission simply encouraged Kenya to adopt 
measures in conformity with its holdings, and Kenya is not necessarily bound 
to carry them out.185 Indeed, over three years after issuing its recommenda-
tions, the Commission was still calling on Kenya to conform to the decision as 
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it was “concerned by the lack of feedback from the Government of Kenya on 
the measures it has taken to implement the Endorois decision.”186 
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not limit its rul-
ings to encouragements and recommendations, but rather issues decrees that it 
transmits to Member States and Council Ministers of the African Union with 
the intention that they monitor their execution.187 Despite this intention, how-
ever, the court is still plagued with roadblocks to actual effective enforce-
ment.188 One of the main issues is the inability of the court to deal with urgent 
human rights violations, as it operates on a part-time basis.189 In addition, even 
if the court orders sanctions on a state to pay fair compensation or implement 
other measures, there is the likelihood that the state will simply refuse to com-
ply.190 There is, indeed, evidence that Kenya has thus far failed to halt evic-
tions of the Ogiek tribe in accordance with the court’s ruling in 2013.191 Be-
cause of the aforementioned need for continued investment on a large scale, 
this may be an increasingly likely reaction.192 
Finally, the nature of the international system’s allocation of responsibil-
ity is flawed in its ability to create lasting protections.193 States are the primary 
subjects of law in the international order, and as such the claims made in inter-
national human rights bodies are brought against states to ensure that they 
comply with norms.194 While decisions such as the court’s 2013 ban on land 
transactions in a certain area may affect corporations, they do not directly 
place accountability on the corporation; instead, the international system plac-
es responsibility on the state, and corporations are only indirectly subject to 
state enforcement. 195 This state-centric regime creates a glaring lack of ac-
countability for corporations who may in fact never experience direct repri-
mand for violations of human rights.196 
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C. The Potential for BITs to Guarantee Indigenous Rights in Africa 
It is because protection emanating from within the legal framework of the 
African continent is not likely to be forthcoming, whether from the national or 
international sphere, that it must come from without.197 By imposing human 
rights obligations on corporations through BITs, the home states of corpora-
tions purchasing land in Africa may be able to regulate the deprivation of land 
rights of indigenous populations.198 
While African states have a strong incentive to avoid implementing pro-
tections, capital exporting states provide an environment much more amenable 
to limiting the freedom of corporations.199 Within many of these investor 
states, there is a strong tradition of corporate social responsibility.200 Particu-
larly in the European Union, there has been a concerted effort in the past dec-
ade to address the human rights responsibilities of corporations, with attempts 
to pass sweeping continent-wide rules and regulations.201 It must be recognized 
that the survey of states investing in Africa on a large scale is not a uniform 
collection, and there are some major players such as China that do not have a 
strong tradition of implementing regulations that impose human rights obliga-
tions on private actors.202 While the environment in investor states is thus far 
from perfect, it is important that the potential impetus is slanted towards pro-
tection as compared to the internal African impetus that is likely to resist pro-
tection.203 
If capital exporting states are thus willing to enact reform, a potential op-
tion could be the implementation of human rights protections in BITs.204 Cur-
rently, the protection of BITs generally extends to the foreign investor to guar-
antee fair and equitable treatment and prevent expropriation without just com-
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pensation.205 This paradigm of protection regime can be reversed to provide 
protections to the indigenous peoples occupying purchased land.206 The protec-
tions provided in standard model BITs are one-sided; providing financial guar-
antees to the private actor, the corporation, whereas provisions which promote 
the interests of the other side, the state receiving investment, are scarce.207 This 
type of protection, however, can be implemented on the other side of the 
agreement to provide human rights guarantees to the indigenous population, 
and hold corporations responsible for breaches of these guarantees.208 
The issue of human rights guarantees has arisen within the context of 
these treaties.209 It has been limited, however, to disputing or defending a do-
mestic human rights law over the claim that it violates a provision of the trea-
ty.210 For example, a corporation’s claim for unjust expropriation was brought 
to arbitration in South Africa over a law that required 26 percent of companies 
in the mining industry to be owned by “Historically Disadvantaged Black Afri-
cans.”211 Thus, these treaties have served as a forum for indirectly addressing 
indigenous rights, but only because they provided a potential avenue for corpo-
rate avoidance.212 Express mention of human rights within the language of 
BITs, on the other hand, has been almost non-existent—exceptional treaties 
that do in fact make reference to human rights do so without creating any sub-
stantive obligations and instead, mention human rights in the preamble or as an 
aid to interpretation.213 
The next step is to present these treaties as an affirmative protection of 
indigenous rights by modifying them to impose obligations on corporate actors 
to maintain certain standards.214 By making a corporation itself legally ac-
countable at the international level, it will serve as a significant deterrent to 
engaging in the type of behavior that has caused the failure of domestic sys-
tems, such as cursory and ineffective consultations.215 Unlike a state, which 
might dodge the payment of sanctions due to lack of enforcement, a corpora-
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tion is far more unlikely to avoid payment of an international arbitral award.216 
First, most parties to binding arbitrations voluntarily comply with the award.217 
Second, depending on the law of the home country, there will likely be a ready 
mechanism for enforcement in the form of either summary enforcement under 
the home country’s laws, or the ability to sue on the award in the national 
courts.218 The home state may even intervene in the arbitration against a do-
mestic corporation, indicating its willingness to enforce the award domestical-
ly.219 Because awards would be enforceable under this model, corporations 
would likely be far more rigorous in ensuring that human rights are respected 
in order to avoid a claim.220 An ideal system would allow an indigenous popu-
lation to bring a claim directly to an arbitral tribunal against a corporation of 
the capital exporting state.221 This would surmount the procedural hurdles that 
plague the African international adjudicatory system.222 
The modification of BITs to contain these protections may face some hos-
tility from African states as trespassing on a state’s sovereign ability to set its 
own social policy.223 The fundamental need for investment, however, may 
nonetheless ultimately force accession to such modifications, because not sign-
ing would result in negative signals about the stability of the investment cli-
mate and likely discourage investment to an even greater degree.224 Many Af-
rican nations desperately needing economic growth have no alternative to rely-
ing on such external financing, and therefore may feel forced to accept the 
lesser of two evils and sign agreements containing express corporate responsi-
bilities for human rights.225 
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CONCLUSION 
Indigenous peoples without title to their lands are an inherently vulnera-
ble group, and yet the danger of corporate predation on these indigenous lands 
has only become recognized at both the national and international level in re-
cent years. Governments and international organizations have made attempts to 
provide the necessary protections to these peoples, yet these attempts have 
proved glaringly inadequate within the African continent. The explosion of 
foreign interest in developing African real estate has fortuitously paralleled the 
need for infrastructure development in many African states. This has created a 
powerful incentive for national regimes to collude with corporate actors in 
massive purchases and developments that are often exceptionally destructive to 
the rights of the indigenous inhabitants. The sparse legislation in place at a na-
tional level has proved generally ineffective at overcoming the incentive of 
development, and the international regime has been unable to provide an ac-
cessible and comprehensive forum that adequately addresses the scale of the 
problem. Protections may, however, originate from the home states of the cor-
porate actors, which are not bound by the need for foreign investment. By al-
tering bilateral investment treaties between these capital exporting states and 
the African states to include human rights protections, communities could be 
able to hold corporations directly responsible for their violations of indigenous 
land rights. 
  
 
 
